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REGULATORY DECISIONMAKING IN THE EUROPEAN

COMMISSION
George A. Bermann*
INTRODUCTION
As an institution variously described as the "motor"' or "engine"' of
European integration and as the European Union's "executive branch,"' the
Commission of the European Communities finds itself at the center of
Community decisionmaking. Yet its decisional processes are still quite poorly
understood, at least in the United States." The relatively poor grasp of
Commission decisionmaking is certainly not due to any general lack of interest
in procedure within the American audience. The problem lies more in the
highly restrictive view of decisionmaking that traditionally dominates
procedural accounts of the Community institutions. Those accounts have
tended to reflect three preoccupations. The first is the question of the
respective decisional roles of the European Union's three main political
institutions - Council, Commission and Parliament" - and of their
relationship to the Community courts.' The second preoccupation relates to
the fact that those institutions have three quite distinct legislative procedures
* Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law, New York,
New York. The author acknowledges with gratitude the research assistance of Helle Thorsen,
Esq., managing editor of the Columbia Journal of European Law.
Part II of this article appears in substantially similar form in George A. Bermann, Regulatory
Cooperation between the European Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 ADM. L. J.
993 (1996).
1 Geoffrey Edwards & David Spence, The Commission in Perspective, in THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION 1, 15 (G. Edwards & D. Spence, eds., 1994) [hereinafter "THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION"]. The Commission has also been called the "heart" of the Community system. JeanVictor Louis & Denis Waelbroeck, La Commission: au coeur du syst~me institutionnel des
Communaut6s Europ6ennes (1989).
' See GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 58 (1993).
' Former Commission President Delors called the Commission "a beginning [une amorce] of a

European Government." Eurobarometer, May 1994. For a note of caution about calling the
Commission the Community's "executive branch," see, however, Peter Ludlow, The European
Commission, in THE NEW EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 85 (R. Keohane & S. Hoffmann, eds., 1991).
' The relative academic neglect of Commission decisionmaking among European institutions is
evidently true of European academic community as well. See Edwards & Spence, supra note 1, at
1.
I See Dietrich Rometsch & Wolfgang Wessels,
The Commission and the Council of Ministers,

in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 202-24; Martin Westlake, The European
Parliament, in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 225-48.
' See John A. Usher, The Commission and the Law, in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra

note 1,at 146-68.
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for the enactment of Community law, namely the parliamentary consultation,
parliamentary cooperation and parliamentary co-decision procedures. 7 Finally,
within each of these procedures, attention is invariably drawn to the different
voting formulas in the Council (simple majority voting, qualified majority
voting, or unanimity) and to the relative difficulties of obtaining the requisite
Council majorities, 8 especially with further EU enlargements.
The traditional interest of US scholars in the "inter-institutional" and
voting aspects of the Community's legislative procedure is fairly easy to
explain. First, judging by the agendas of recent and projected
intergovernmental conferences,' the issues are topical and preoccupy the
Europeans themselves. Second, the issues clearly have important implications
for the balance of power, not only among the Member States and among the
institutions, but also between the Member States and the institutions; this will
explain why the Court of Justice has recently seen so much litigation over the
"correct legal basis" of legislative enactments.10 Finally, the newer legislative
processes have to them a sheer complexity, certainly as compared with the
basically unitary character of the legislative process at both at the state and
federal levels in the US; that complexity itself naturally invites attention.
Mastering the intricacies of the Community's legislative processes and their
political implications is difficult, but also in a sense illusory - much like
focusing on the mechanics of how a bill becomes a law in the United States.
Although the Council, the Commission and the Parliament perform
characteristic functions in the enactment of Community legislation," each of
these institutions has its own complex internal processes for determining the
positions that it will take within the relevant legislative mechanisms. The
internal aspects of decisionmaking by the European Commission constitute the
focus of this article.
Part I explains this article's focus on the Commission among the various
institutions of the European Union, and more particularly on the
Commission's role as chief legislative proponent. When the Commission
formulates regulatory policy, even if only in the form of legislative proposals,
it performs functions most closely analogous to the rulemaking activity
entrusted to administrative agencies in the United States. In Part II, I trace in
some institutional detail the Commission's actual procedures for formulating
such proposals for adoption by the Council. As this part of the article seeks to
show, the rulemaking activities of the Commission are ones in which the
contribution of the "services," that is the permanent staff below the
See Westlake, supra note 5, at 225, 234-36.

'

PHILIP RAWORTH, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 69-72 (1993).

' See, for example, EU Bull. 5/95, point 1.9.1-9.4; EC Bull. 4-1990, point 1.12-35; David
O'Keeffe, The Challenges Facing the Union, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 135 (1994).

"0See e.g. European Parliament v. Council, (Shipments of waste), Case 187/93, 1994 E.C.R.
1-2857; and Commission v. Council, (Titanium dioxide), Case C-300/89, 1991 E.C.R. 2867. See
generally Usher, supra note 6, at 148-52.
" See Rometsch & Wessels, supra note 5 at 203, 211 etseq.; Westlake, supra note 5 at 234239.
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Commissioner level, is particularly vital. In Part III, by way of conclusion, I
seek to identify, in explicit comparison with certain aspects of US
administrative agencies, some of the general institutional features of the
Commission that seem to have most basically influenced its performance of the
legislative proposal function.
This article seeks, in short, to address the need for a better grasp of the
Commission as counterpart to the regulatory agencies of the United States.
Although a comparison between EU and US rulemaking is bound to enhance
understanding of the administrative process generally, the search for activity
within the Community paralleling the regulatory development activity of US
agencies is by no means a purely academic exercise. As US regulators
increasingly explore the benefits of bilateral regulatory cooperation with
overseas governments,"2 they need to know where within those governments
such activity takes place and to understand the procedure by which it is
conducted. Parties who seek to influence Commission policymaking have a
similar need."3
I.

THE COMMISSION AS REGULATORY PROPONENT

The European Commission is in some ways the most compelling of the
European Union's institutions in terms of internal decisionmaking. This is not
because the Commission enjoys ultimate political authority within the
Community; that authority remains in the hands of the Council and, to a very
limited extent, in the Parliament."' The Council, moreover, is still the setting
in which tensions between the Community and the Member States, as well as
tensions among the States themselves, are most visible. As for the European
Parliament, it remains the Community's one directly and democratically
elected branch,1" accommodating representation of cross-border interests,
whether in the form of political party groupings or more general economic and
political interests. 6 For that reason, it holds considerable promise in terms of
future institutional and functional growth. Their high political profiles have
11George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation With Counterpart Agencies Abroad. The
FAA's Aircraft Certification Experience, 4 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 669, 714 et seq. (1993),

George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation between the European Commission and U.S.
Administrative Agencies, 9 ADM L. J. - (1996); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION - LIMITED PROGRESS ON DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL DESIGN
STANDARDS 24-31 (1992); George A. Bermann, Managing Regulatory Rapprochement:
Institutional and Procedural Approaches, in REGULATORY COOPERATION
FOR AN
INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 73-91 (1994). See also Michael Smith, The Commission and External
Relations, in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 249, 261.
's

Martin Donnelly, The Structure of the European Commission and the Policy Formation

Process, in LOBBYING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 74 (Sonia Mazey & Jeremy Richardson,

eds., 1993).
1" RAWORTH, supra note 8, at 11.
18 Id. at 38.
' See Alberta Sbragia, The European Community: A Balancing Act, 23 PUBLIUS 23, 33-34

(1993).
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made the Council and Parliament the chief focus of the institutional
challenges entailed in future enlargements of Community membership.
The Commission nevertheless continues to bear the largest and most diverse
decisional burden within the Community. The Commission exercises both the
regulatory powers vested in it directly by the Treaty 17 and those delegated to it
by the Council.' 8 It negotiates treaties with third countries on behalf of the
Community pursuant to Council mandate.' 9 It makes countless investigative
and prosecutorial decisions in the competition law20 and state aids areas,2 ' and
in many cases final decisions on the merits. The Commission addresses
numerous other decisions - exemptions and derogations, for example - to
both private parties and governments; 22 these include countless management
and financial decisions in such areas as agriculture and access to structural
funds. It investigates Member State infringements of Community law under
Article 169, pursuing many of them to settlement or to judgment in the Court
of Justice,22 and intervenes regularly in all categories of decisions before the
Community courts. 24 The range and importance of these powers are
in view of the relatively small size of the permanent
particularly striking
28
Commission staff.
Among the Commission's most vital decisional powers - and the one
highlighted in this article - is a power that is strictly speaking not decisional
at all, in that it does not produce any binding or otherwise legally effective
instrument. This is the Commission's power to formulate proposals for
adoption by the Council as Community legislation, a power that has grown
with the expansion of Community competences.2" The power to propose within
the Community is more far-reaching than at first appears, due to the fact that
the Council may not, as a general matter, adopt any legislation unless and
until the Commission has presented it with a formal proposal to that or similar
effect.2 7 Accordingly, the Commission in a very strict sense sets the Council's
legislative agenda.
" The grant of the Commission's general regulatory power is implicit in Article 155 of the EC
Treaty. Additionally, the Commission has regulatory power under specific EC Treaty articles, e.g.
art. 90(3).

"8The Council may delegate regulatory power to the Commission under Article 155 of the EC
Treaty. See e.g. Council Regulation 768/68 (general rules on the denaturing of sugar for animal
feeding stuffs), O.J. (L 143) 12, under which the Commission was empowered to exercise the
necessary authority to ensure the fulfillment of the regulation's objective.
EC Treaty, art. 228(1).
30

Id., art. 89.

"

Id., art. 90(3).

22

61.
23

24

See, e.g.. EC Treaty, arts. 79(4), 87, 89 & 93(2); see generally Usher, supra note 6, at 156id. at 156-59.
See Usher, supra note 6, at 146, 156-59.

2' See Ludlow, supra note 3, at 94. The permanent staff numbers around 12,000.
2 Rometsch & Westlake, supra note 5, at 211-12. The upturn in legislative initiative on the
part of the Commission has been identified as an aspect of "the Delors effect." See Ludlow, supra
note 3, at 116-19.
27 EC Treaty arts. 189a, 189b 189c. See RAWORTH, supra note 8, at 24.
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Moreover, until such time as the Council actually enacts legislation
pursuant to a Commission proposal, the Commission has the ongoing privilege
of withdrawing the proposal, and doing so effectively ends the legislative
process regarding that measure.28 The Commission may also choose likewise at any time prior to the adoption of legislation - to modify the terms
of its proposal." The significance of this amending power derives from the fact
that, under all of the legislative procedures in use, the Council's voting
requirements vary depending on whether the Council is voting on the measure
in the same terms in which the Commission has last proposed it, or on some
variant of that text. For example, while the Treaty frequently permits the
Council to adopt a measure by a mere qualified majority vote of its members,
the Council may do so only insofar as it is voting upon the measure in the
same terms most recently proposed by the Commission. Adoption of any
variation on the Commission's latest proposal requires the Council's
unanimous approval.30 Clearly, the Commission's ongoing power to fix the
terms - and the only terms - on which the Council may enact a measure by
less than the unanimous consent of its members allows it to shape the
legislative result, sometimes decisively. The systematic advantage that the
Commission proposal enjoys over all competing drafts takes on even greater
significance when viewed in light of the Commission's continuing power of
modification. Particularly under the newer cooperation and co-decision
procedures, the Commission plays in addition the ongoing role of arbiter
between Council and Parliament."
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL PROCESS

Although each legislative initiative follows a course within the Commission
that is in some respects unique to it, the Commission pursues a general
methodology of legislative development. Understanding the Commission's
approach to the development of legislation requires looking below the level of
the twenty Commissioners who currently comprise the "college. 3 2 Once the
college has been named by the Member State governments, its members
decide upon the allocation of "portfolios" among Commissioners. 3 But those
28 EC Treaty art. 189a(2). See RAWORTH, supra note 8, at 26, 93, 116-17; Usher, supra note
6, at 147.
28 EC Treaty art. 189a(2). See Usher, supra note 6, at 147.
80 EC Treaty art. 189a(1). See RAWORTH, supra note 8, at 26. The only exception is under the
new co-decision procedure, which permits Council adoption of a modified version of the
Commission proposal when necessary to reach an accommodation with the Parliament within the
Conciliation Committee set up under that procedure. Id. at 26, 116-17. See Usher, supra note 6,
at 146-47.
3I See Ludlow, supra note 3, at 98.
2 Act Concerning the Conditions of Access of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of
Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden and the Adjustments to the Treaties
of which the European Union is Founded, 1994 O.J. (C 241), at 24.
'3 David Spence, Structure. Functions and Procedures in the Commission, in THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, supra note 1,at 97, 99. The Commission President may play an active role in the
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portfolios do not organize the work of the Commission as an institution. The
Commission staff is instead organized into twenty-four subject matter units, or
Directorates-General, each headed by a Director-General, 84 plus several
functional services, including the Legal Service. Each Director-General
reports, in a sense, to the Commissioner to whose portfolio his or her subject
matters most closely correspond, and that Commissioner will eventually have a
special role to play in bringing legislative proposals emanating from the
Directorates-General before the Commissioners for action. The DirectoratesGeneral are further divided by subject matter into Directorates, which in turn
are subdivided into Units; these are headed by Directors and Heads of Unit,
respectively. s6 It is typically within the Units, sometimes known as the
"services," that the basic work entailed in developing legislative proposals is
performed.
The Launching of a Regulatory Initiative
Ideas for new legislative measures may originate anywhere in the
Commission, whether in the office of one of the Commissioners or DirectorsGeneral, or from any point within the Units into which the DirectoratesGeneral and Directorates are further divided. Ideas may be generated not only
by individuals or teams found within the Commission hierarchy, but also by
the many outside persons and institutions with which the Commissioners, their
staffs or the services interact. These include members of the other major
institutions of the Community (notably the Council and Parliament), persons
from different echelons within the Member State governments, and persons
involved in the lobbying efforts conducted by private sector groups and public
interest organizations.
The EC Treaty formally invites the Council to request that the Commission
submit to it proposals on a particular subject matter.86 As amended by the
Maastricht Treaty, the EC Treaty extends this right of request to the
European Parliament"" and, within limits, to the Committee of Regions, the
European Monetary Institute, and the Member States. 8 Other bodies,
whether set up directly by the EC Treaty (as in the case of the Economic and
Social Committee [ECOSOC] or the Monetary Committee) or, more often,
pursuant to Council legislation, may also play this role. As a practical matter,
however, it is the Commission that determines whether a particular regulatory
initiative shall be pursued. 89 It also determines the timing, the conceptual
framework, and the content of the initiative.
allocation decision but, strictly speaking, the Commissioners decide collectively, if necessary by
vote.
- Id. at 97, 100-01.
35 Id.

EC Treaty, art. 152.
SI

Id., art. 138b.

id., arts. 138b, 198, 198c, 109d, 109f(4).
J. BOULouIs, DROIT INSTITUTIONNEL DES COMMUNAUTt$ EUROP-ENNES 129 (4th ed. 1993).
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The Role of the Commission Services
Once a decision has been made to pursue a legislative proposal on a given
subject, the project is placed in the hands of a Commission official within the
appropriate or "lead"' 0 Directorate-General. Usually a "working party,"
consisting of other Commission staff (most likely representing a number of
interested services) and various outside experts and consultants, will be
assembled under that official's chairmanship. On other occasions, the process
begins instead with a Commission "green paper," setting out general policy
guidelines and serving as the basis for consultations with interested parties.
The Directorate-General in which the project is undertaken'" will typically
draw up a Working Document describing the issues that the legislation is
expected to address, and progressively amend that document as the legislative
work itself proceeds.' 2 The legislative efforts can extend over months and very
possibly over years. As part of a recent campaign to improve the "openness"
and "transparency" of its regulatory processes, the Commission is seeking to
widen and deepen its consultations with Member States (including national
parliaments) and with private sector and public interest groups throughout the
period in which its legislative proposals are taking shape. Nevertheless, the
Commission reserves almost complete discretion as to the quantity and timing
of consultations to be had, the range of persons and institutions whose
participation is to be engaged, and the intensity of that participation. The
legislative projects undertaken by the Commission services are reflected in the
Commission's annual "work program."' 3
The Commission has an extensive network of permanent and ad hoc
advisory committees which not only furnish the services with technical and
policy advice on issues requiring special expertise, but also provide them with
early warning of the difficulties into which a policy initiative may run as it
travels its course toward adoption as a proposal by the Commission, comment
by Parliament and other bodies, and decision in the Council. A first category
consists of "expert" committees composed of specialists of various sorts
nominated by the national governments. Their advice is especially welcome
since they may anticipate Member State objections, and their members may
even reappear in the Working Groups that will eventually advise the Council
should the measure later come before the latter for adoption. A second
category consists of "consultative" committees organized and funded by the
Commission itself to collect the views of different private economic groupings
without the involvement of the Member State governments. Their members
are drawn heavily from among the full-time employees of various economic
40 Spence,

supra note 33, at 104.
"As a general rule only one Directorate-General should be the lead department."
Commission Manual of Operational Procedures, sec. 8.1.2.
42 Id., sec. 8.1.1. See also id. sec. 9.2: "The Directorate-General responsible for the matter in
hand takes the lead in drawing up the document in due form on the responsibility of the
appropriate Member of the Commission."
,1 Commission Rules of Procedure, art. 4.
"
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associations and groups, such as labor, industry or particular agricultural
sectors. The extent of reliance on such committees, and the extent of their
influence, vary greatly among Directorates-General."
Assuming the legislative project is not for some reason shelved or subsumed
by initiatives taken by another Commission division, the effort will in principle
culminate in a preliminary draft proposal. Although this proposal may not be
published officially, it will be circulated among other Commission services that
may have an interest in it, but are not as yet involved,' 5 as well as among the
Member States (including both their parliaments and their administrations)
and among relevant private and public organizations. Lobbying of the
Commission services on behalf of affected interests has become a common
4
feature of the process. "

From Preliminary to Final Draft Proposal
The transition of the proposal from preliminary to final draft will depend on
the commentary received and the difficulty of the compromises that need to be

struck. While the preliminary proposal will by this time have taken fairly
concrete shape, it will still be widely open to comment and to change. At some
point in this process, as the focus sharpens, the Commissioner who is
responsible for the Directorate-General in which this legislative activity is
centered will become closely involved in revisions of the preliminary draft
proposal. Should the measure eventually come before the full Commission for
adoption as a proposal, it is this Commissioner who will normally play the
leading role on the matter within the "college."

The reworked proposal is subject, under the Commission's internal rules of
procedure, to a number of required consultations. These include consultations
N. NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT

AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 68-69 (1991).
The Commission's Rules of Procedure call for departments involved in the preparation of
Commission decisions to work together as closely as possible. More specifically, the department
responsible for a measure is required to consult with other departments associated or concerned
with the subject in sufficient time before submitting the measure to the Commission. Art. 20,
para. 2. According to the Commission's Manual of Operating Procedures (sec. 8.1.1.), "[t]o
ensure efficient cooperation and optimum consultation, the lead department should make informal
contact with the other departments concerned as soon as it begins work on drafting a proposal."
It is further provided that mention shall be made of any important files currently under
consideration or about to go before the Commission at the weekly meeting of the several
Directors-General. Id. sec. 8.1.2. See also sec. 9.3.: "The Directorate-General responsible must
involve from the outset all the other departments with an interest in the topic in question or in
some aspect of it."
4 There are reported to be around 3,000 special interest groups active in Brussels. Sonia
Mazey & Jeremy Richardson, The Commission and the Lobby, in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
supra note 1, at 169, 181. "Officials know that they need to mobilize the support of those interests
directly affected by EC legislative proposals since the legislation is otherwise unlikely to be
adopted by the Council or implemented effectively. Most groups therefore experience little
difficulty in gaining access to Commission officials." Id. at 171.
44
"
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with the other Commission services that are legitimately interested,'47 with the
individual Commissioner in charge of the Directorate-General that is
responsible (to the extent that he or she is not already involved), and with any
outside committee that is required under the Treaty to be consulted at this
stage. "' It is impossible to generalize about the amount of change that these
consultations are likely to produce. However seriously their criticisms may be
taken, none of the bodies consulted is in a position to insist that changes be
made to the proposal. The furthest the rules go in this direction is to provide
that the service in charge must consider and attempt to accommodate the
views of the other interested services within the Commission and, where
unable to do so, at least acknowledge those views in the final draft proposal. 9
It is customary, too, for the proposal to be submitted to the office of each of
the other Commissioners, where it is assigned for study and discussion either
to a working group composed of the interested Commissioners or the
appropriate members of their cabinets. It is fair to say that the Working Party
- by now in close contact over the matter with the responsible Commissioner
and other Commission members or their staff - will endeavor to find some
sort of common ground, though without undue sacrifice to the measure's
central objectives or to its overall coherence.
Regulatory Impact Analyses
The Commission's proposal-making procedures require the conduct of
several different "impact analyses." One such analysis is the so-called "small
and medium-sized business impact analysis," required to be submitted to the
Commission's Directorate-General XXIII (DG XXIII). Under the
Commission's Manual of Operations, each text submitted to the Commission
for adoption as a legislative proposal must be analyzed in terms of its
economic impact on small and medium-sized businesses. This assessment is
meant to cover not only the proposed rules' direct economic implications for
small and medium-sized businesses, but also the compliance costs and
administrative burdens that it would impose on them. In its review, DG XXIII
may question the adequacy or accuracy of the analysis, and its questions may
41 Commission Rules of Procedure, art. 20. See Spence, supra note 33, at 105-07. Weekly
meetings of the Directors-General and the chefs de cabinets of the Commissioners, as well as
meetings of standing "interservice groups," help ensure that such coordination occurs.
4'Such committees may include, among others, the Monetary Committee and the Economic
and Social Committee. See RAWORTH, supra note 8, at 33.
49 Commission Rules of Procedure, art. 20, para. 3. According to the Commission's Manual of
Operational Procedures:
The object of the coordination exercise should be to achieve as wide a consensus as possible.
In the event of disagreement, if the originating department feels it is justified in adhering to
its original proposal despite objections from the other departments, it should explain its
reasons and, if so requested, record the differences of opinion when making its submission to
the Commission. Irreconcilable differences of opinion should be objectively recorded by the
department responsible in the document submitted to the Commission.
Sec. 8.1.1. See also id., sec. 9.3.
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cause the responsible service to revise its analysis; DG XXIII does not,
however, have authority to require that changes be made to the proposed
measure itself.
The published procedures of the Commission now also require the
responsible service to demonstrate in a memorandum accompanying the final
proposal that it considered and rejected regulatory alternatives. 50
Consideration of regulatory alternatives is meant to promote respect for the
general principle of "proportionality." The principle, established by the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 51 and more recently affirmed in the
Maastricht amendments to the EC Treaty," requires the Community, in
essence, to favor "the least restrictive alternative."
As amended at Maastricht, the EC Treaty also expresses a general
Community law principle of "subsidiarity," meaning that the Community
should not take legislative action within fields of concurrent Community and
Member State jurisdiction if action at the Member State level could
adequately accomplish the Community's objectives."3 Accordingly, the
Commission's internal rules now require that the explanatory memorandum
accompanying a final text for adoption as a Commission proposal contain a
statement demonstrating that the proposal is also consistent with the principle
of subsidiarity. (Internal Commission procedures had already required that
the explanatory memorandum contain a paragraph outlining the difficulties
that Member States could expect to encounter in implementing any
Community directive that was contemplated.)" Finally, the EC Treaty as
amended at Maastricht obligates the Commission to ensure that all legislative
proposals to the Council can be financed, so far as Community expenditures
are concerned, from the Community's own resources.6 5 The "fiche financi6re,"
which is required to accompany any proposal for adoption by the Commission,
will set out the proposal's financial implications; since the Community has
limited resources to be allocated among an increasing number of policy areas,
00

"So as to avoid any initial bias, the originating department should at an early stage provide

all the facts and general information on which its proposals are based, including any arguments in
favor of alternative solutions. If several options are available, the originating department should
give the reasons for its preference at the outset." Commission Manual of Operational Procedures,
sec. 8.1.1.

Documents provided to the Commission in support of a proposed measure are required to
provide "all the information required for assessing the political and/or economic context" as well
as to mention "any alternative solutions ... and their respective merits." Id. sec. 9.5.1.
"1The principle was first established in Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v.
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fiir
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
62 EC Treaty, art. 3b, para. 3.
s' Id., art. 3b, para. 1.

Commission Manual of Operating Procedures, sec. 9.5.1(b).
EC Treaty, art. 201a. The Commission's Rules of Procedures require that the DirectoratesGeneral responsible for Budgets, Financial Control, Personnel and Administration be consulted on
all proposed measures that may have implications for budget and finances, personnel, or
administration, respectively. Id,art. 20, para. 2. See also Commission Manual of Operational
Procedures, secs. 9.4.2., 9.4.3. Their statements on a proposed measure are required to accompany
the measure when sent to the Commission for approval. Id., sec. 9.5.1.
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this information
decisionmaking.

will

influence the

Commissioners

in their ultimate

Legal Service Review
Before it is finally submitted to the Commission for adoption, the proposal
must be submitted for formal legal review to the Commission Legal Service."8
This may not, however, be the first time in the long process of legislative
development that the matter will have come before the Legal Service. The
responsible Commission service is likely to have consulted the Legal Service
previously on one or more issues of law surfacing in the drafting process. 7 The
Legal Service's final review of the text will focus on the measure's legality, as
measured by all relevant norms of Community law, substantive and procedural
alike. With the proliferation of legislative procedures under the Treaty - each
providing different institutional roles for the Parliament, Council and
Commission as well as different voting majorities in the Council - the Legal
Service's attention has increasingly been drawn to the question of the
"correctness" of the proposal's "legal basis" in the Treaty, but its review
covers the full range of legal issues that the proposal raises. In the end, the
Legal Service will give a favorable or unfavorable opinion on the text in
question. In the latter event, it states its reasons in a note attached to the draft
measure submitted for approval to the Commission."8
Adoption of a Proposal by the Commission
At this point, the final draft proposal is conveyed to the responsible
Commissioner, accompanied by (1) an explanatory memorandum containing
any required impact analyses, (2) the opinion of the Legal Service, and (3)
any committee opinions required by the Treaty to be obtained.5 That
Commissioner's objective is presumably to have the draft adopted by the
Commission acting as a collegial body; it is he or she who will in any event
move the proposal's adoption.60 To that end, the draft is first submitted to the
relevant cabinet committee - i.e. a committee chaired by the relevant cabinet
member of the Commission President and consisting of his or her counterparts
in the cabinets of the other Commissioners - with a member of the
responsible Commission service also present. If the proposal is one expected to
be adopted under the Commission's expedited "written procedure," the
cabinet members will not actually meet - unless of course agreement by
" Commission Rules of Procedure, art. 20, para. 2. See also Commission Manual of
Operational Procedures, sec. 9.4.1.
"The Legal Service must be consulted as soon as possible on any proposals which involved
legal drafting." Commission Manual of Operational Procedures, sec. 8.1.1.
88 Id., sec. 9.4.1.
69 Also attached will be the opinions of the Directorates-General for Budget, Financial Control,
Personnel and Administration, referred to in note 55 supra. See Commission Manual of
Procedural Rules, sec. 9.5.1.
60 Commission Rules of Procedure, art. 6.
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written procedure is blocked. Assuming it is successful, the "written
procedure" dispenses with the requirement of discussion and vote at a full
meeting of the Commissioners.61 In all other cases, the final draft proposal will
be presented at such a meeting.62 Even then, the chefs de cabinet of the
Commissioners - presided over by the Commission's Secretary-General will meet in advance of the Commissioners' own meeting with a view to
reaching agreement on as many remaining issues as possible, so that the
Commissioners themselves can focus strictly on matters of disagreement. The
cabinets thus play a major role in Commission policymaking. Among other
things, they enable individual Commissioners to consider and determine how
to vote on issues lying outside their main areas of responsibility 3 and to deal
directly and continually with lobbyists.64
The Commissioners meet at weekly sessions, under the chairmanship of the
Commission's Secretary-General, to reach their most important decisions,
including the decision to adopt a proposal for legislation. The meetings, which
are not open to the public,6" may end with the proposal's adoption (with or
without amendment), either by consensus or by an actual vote, with passage
requiring an absolute majority vote of the Commissioners in favor." Often,
however, the dossier will be remitted to the responsible Commission service for
further work on one or more outstanding issues. In truth, the Commissioners
have wide discretion over the draft proposal before them. "They may accept it,
reject it, refer it back to the Directorate-General for redrafting, or defer
6 7
taking a decision.

Once all hurdles have been overcome and the proposal is adopted, the text is
translated into all the Community's official languages by the Translation
Service and then published as an official document, accompanied by a revised
explanatory memorandum. In keeping with the principle of subsidiarity, the
memorandum will in relevant cases recite the Commission's basis for
concluding that action at the Community, rather than the Member State, level
1 Id., art. 10. The written procedure may be used only if the Directorates-General involved and
the Legal Service are agreeable to that procedure. Id. A "written procedure" may also be used at
the Cabinet level. In other words, if there is previous agreement at the level of the DirectoratesGeneral, the cabinet members may themselves reach agreement without actually meeting.
62 Id., art. 2.

Martin Donnelly & Ella Ritchie, The College of Commissioners and Their Cabinets, in THE
supra note 1, at 31, 44. See Ludlow, supra note 3, at 93.
",Donnelly & Ritchie, supra note 63, at 45-46. See Martin Donnelly, The Structure of the
European Commission and the Policy Formation Process, supra note 13, at 74, 79-80.
6 Commission Rules of Procedure, art. 7. The Commission's procedural rules also require that
Commission discussions be kept confidential. Id.
66 Id., art. 6, para. 3.
67 NUGENT, supra note 44, at 63. According to one authority:
[W]hat makes the Commission work in practice ... is the existence of a layer of procedures
designed almost to ensure that real power remains outside the services and is focused in the
cabinet system. It is almost as if the Commissioners and their Cabinets let the services play
the game of policy-making, consultation of interest groups and inter-institutional relations,
while reserving both judgment and the exercise of real power to themselves.
Spence, supra note 33, at 97, 113.
63
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was necessary to achieve the Community's regulatory objectives. The proposal
is then ready for submission to the Council for action.6 8
From Commission Proposal to Council Measure
The legislative course of a measure following its submission by the
Commission to the Council varies with the particular legislative procedure
required to be followed under the relevant treaty article. While the details of
these procedures lie beyond the scope of this article, it is safe to say that the
Commission's legislative role scarcely ends at this stage. As noted, the
Commission has the ongoing right to withdraw or amend a proposal even after
the Council's and/or Parliament's deliberations on it are well underway. One
Commissioner will be designated to defend the proposal in high-level political
discussions with the Council.69 Once the proposal comes before the
Parliament, representatives of the competent Directorate-General are likewise
expected to appear before parliamentary committees in its defense.7 0 A
representative of the Commission will in any event be present at, and invited
to address, meetings held in preparation for action by the Council and
Parliament on Commission proposals." Reaction by the Commission to
parliamentary opinions and to the Council's "common position" on a
Commission proposal may be expressed by the Commissioners, acting
collectively as the "college" or through either their chefs de cabinet or an
inter-cabinet committee.7 Under the newer legislative procedures, the
Commission is even likely to issue a formal "re-examined proposal.

'7 8

As a

result, at no point in the legislative process can the Council, the Parliament, or
an interested outsider afford to disregard the Commission's views on the
continuing desirability of the proposal or on the desirability of changes that
may have been proposed by the other institutions. Finally of course, even after
a Commission proposal has ripened into a Community enactment - through
final action of the Council and, in some cases, the Parliament - the
Commission may at any point set in motion a new legislative process with a
view to amending or repealing the enactment.
" Responsibility for seeing to it that Commission instruments are notified to their addresses,
published in the Official Journal of the European Communities, and transmitted as required to
other Community institutions is vested in the Commission's Secretary-General. Commission Rules
of Procedure, art. 15.
" Spence, supra note 33, at 103. Commission representatives are also present at and
participate in meetings of the Council's working groups dealing with the Commission proposal. At
the higher level of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the responsible
Director-General and, occasionally, the competent Commissioner will appear. Rometsch &
Wessels, in THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 5, at 202, 213.
70 A Commissioner, chosen in consideration of the topics at hand, is present at all plenary
sessions of the European Parliament. Westlake, supra note 5, at 225, 229, 236.
1 RAWORTH, supra note 8, at 66.
72 Id. at 63, 99.
71 Id. at 95.
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III. ESSENTIAL INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE
COMMISSION
The Commission's formulation of legislative proposals, like all of its
functions, is shaped by that body's general institutional aspects. Some of the
features that condition the Commission as proponent of Community legislation
- such as the Commissioners' independence from the Member State
governments 7 - are well established, indeed even definitional. This section
seeks to identify certain less obvious characteristics of the Commission and to
assess their significance for the legislative process, particularly in comparison
with United States.
Plenary Collective Authority
One feature of the Commission that shapes its performance as the
Community's chief legislative proponent is the fact that, for its full five-year
term, the same "college" of Commissioners has political and legal authority
over legislative proposals across all Community law sectors; 75 it has, in this
sense, plenary collective responsibility. Moreover, in exercising this
responsibility, the Commission generally operates in a collegial fashion, acting
wherever possible by consensus rather than majority vote. 6
The significance of the Commission's plenary proposal authority is
illustrated by the draft directive on cross-border bank transfers, adopted by
the Commission in October 1994 and as of this writing pending before the
Council." The objective of the bank transfer directive is to curb the length of
time, the fees (including both fee levels and double-charging), and the
technical obstacles entailed in effectuating bank transfers from one EU
country to another. While the proposal's principal rationale is certainly to
promote the free movement of services and capital, 8 it also seeks to
accommodate additional and quite different concerns in the areas of consumer
protection and competition policy. Those concerns are, respectively, the
question of transparency to consumers of the actual transaction costs and
delays of funds transfers by individual banks7 ' and the legality of inter-bank
operating accords enabling banks participating in the cross-border transfer of
funds to comply with the time and cost limitations laid down in the directive.8 0
Consequently, at the same time that the Commission's "lead service" - the
" EC Treaty art. 157(1). But see Ludlow, supra note 3, at 90: "Their European vocation
notwithstanding, Commissioners, and perhaps still more their Cabinets, are national champions,
who defend national positions in the Commission."
Martin Donnelly & Ella Ritchie, The College of Commissioners and Their Cabinets, in THE
supra note 1, at 31-34.
" Id. at 36, 39. See also Ludlow, supra note 3, at 90-93.
7 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Cross-border Transfers, 1994
O.J. (C 360/13), COM(94)436 final.
76 Id.,
recital 1-3, 7.
" Id., recital 8, arts. 3-4.
80 Id., recital 9.
7
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internal market staff - was focusing on the free movement issues, the
Commission's consumer protection and competition law units were addressing
aspects of the cross-border transfer of funds that were of greatest interest to
them. Although the three Commission services chiefly involved are organized
in different Directorates-General and report to different Commissioners, the
requirement that they deal with their concerns in a single legislative text, to be
approved by the Commission as a whole, necessitated coordination and,
ultimately, an accommodation of the different interests in issue. '
This is not to suggest that the compromises reached at the level of
Commissioners to reconcile the pressures emanating from the various
Commission services are in all cases sound ones, but merely that they are
institutionally necessary. Curiously, there are proposals circulating within the
Community that would erode the reservation of regulatory authority to the
Commission, for example, by diverting some regulatory responsibilities to
specialized bodies designated as "independent" - independent not only of the
Member States (as is the Commission already) but also of the Commission
itself.8 Whether and how far to compromise the Commission's traditional
monopoly of the power to formulate legislative proposals, in the interest of
greater speed, efficiency and expertise in the conduct of government business,
is a question certain to figure on the 1996 intergovernmental conference
agenda. In addressing that question, European leaders should take note that
the fragmentation of US regulatory authority among different agencies some of them not even located within the Executive Branch or otherwise
responsible to the US President - is widely regarded as compromising the
coherence and consistency of federal regulations.8
The Central Role of the Commission Legal Service
In the previous section, I sought to show that concentration in the
Commission of power to make legislative proposals permits a higher degree of
policy coordination than might otherwise be the case. At the same time, the
prominence within the Commission of a Legal Service - which is at the
disposal not only of the "college" of Commissioners, but also of the different
services" - increases the likelihood that the Commission will demonstrate
respect for basic Community law principles, at least insofar as the Legal
Service understands them. Significantly, the Legal Service is commonly
described as "horizontal," 85 that is, situated so as to serve all of the
Commission's vertically-arranged units. The Commission thus has not only
See generally Donnelly & Ritchie, supra note 75, at 37-38.
8'See Ludlow, supra note 3, at 126.
83 See generally, WILLIAM F. Fox, JR. UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 145-93 (2d ed.,
1992).
" Ludlow, supra note 3, at 95; Spence, supra note 33, at 107.
85 See, for example, Spence, supra note 33, at 99. The other main "horizontal" unit within the
Commission is the Secretariat-General, which is responsible, among other things, for ensuring
coordination among the Commissioners and between the Commissioners and the Services.
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broad political responsibility for shaping Community policy, but also frontline legal responsibility - through its own Legal Service - for ensuring that
this policy, whatever it may be, comports with the Treaty of Rome and with
fundamental Community law principles including proportionality,"
subsidiarity, 87 and respect for human rights." Every legislative proposal of the
Commission comes before the Legal Service - if not early in the course of its
development, then at least at some point prior to adoption by the Commission
- for an assessment from all salient points of view, non-legal as well as legal.
The incontestably high quality of its members makes the Service an
immensely valuable resource to the Commission." By contrast, the US lacks a
single government-wide legal department that stands separate and apart from
the "vertical" units composing the executive and administrative branches, and
exercises direct and continual influence over regulatory action at the highest
political levels.
The Legal Service, as noted, is not the Commission's only important
horizontal unit. The Secretariat-General also performs government-wide
monitoring of Commission activities, a good example of which is its periodic
reporting to the European Council on the Commission's enforcement of the
subsidiarity and proportionality principles."0 While such reports are
necessarily in the nature of institutional self-assessments, and for that reason
at least somewhat suspect, they express the Commission's institutional
commitment to those legal principles and demonstrate how the Commission for example, by withdrawing legislative proposals or proposing the repeal of
legislation - may give them concrete effect. Despite their apparent sympathy
for legal principles of this sort, neither the US Congress, nor existing interagency mechanisms within the US, nor the Office of Management and Budget
within the executive branch, examines legislative performance so
systematically. 1
The Transparency Challenge
A recent preoccupation of the Commission, due in part to criticism levelled
at that body during ratification of the Maastricht Treaty as remote and
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
8' EC Treaty, art. 3b, para. 2.
8" The requirement of respect for human rights has now been codified in art. F(2) of the TEU.
The Legal Service has been described as lending the Commission "an administrative,
political and public relations power base of enormous skill and intellectual agility .... Ensuring
that the Legal Service is in agreement with the principle at issue is clearly . . . one way of
commanding respect and acceptance for the proposal." Spence, supra note 33, at 101, 107. For a
full account, see Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Role of the Legal Service of the Commission of the
European Communities in the Creation of Community Law (The Exeter Lecture in European
Community Law) (1981).
" Westlake, supra note 5, at 246.
" George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously. Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 403-27 (1994)
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bureaucratic," relates to the openness of its decisional processes. Although
decisionmaking transparency has not traditionally been accorded as much
weight in European government circles as it has, generally speaking, in the
United States, change has occurred."3 However, the record may best be
described as mixed: traditionally open with respect to giving interested parties
an opportunity to convey their views on proposed legislation, increasingly
liberal on access to official documents, and still restrictive as to early working
documents and to decisional processes "at the top," that is, among the
Commissioners themselves.
The pursuit of openness and transparency in the European Union is
invariably linked to the notion of bringing government closer to the people,
thereby enhancing its political legitimacy. 4 It is worth rememb:ring, however,
that political legitimacy depends on other considerations as well considerations for which greater openness and transparency, however valuable,
may provide no substitute. The most critical of these is probably the
Commissioners' relative lack of democratic accountability." In addition, the
question today is bound to arise whether a proposed measure constitutes the
least restrictive of all available and reasonably effective means for government
to meet a defined objective, whether that objective could be reasonably well
achieved at a lower level of government, and indeed whether attainment of the
objective requires government action at all (as opposed to free market
behavior or action on the part of voluntary associations) - in other words,
whether the measure complies with subsidiarity, proportionality and a
preference for deregulation. Arguably, greater openness and transparency
yields better Commission decisionmaking because they expose the
Commission's reasoning and thereby subject it to criticism along
proportionality, subsidiarity and market theory lines, among others. Plainly,
however, should the Commission, and subsequently the Council, fail to act in
perceived harmony with these principles, the heightened transparency may
only impair the institutions' legitimacy and aggravate the misgivings that
initially fueled the transparency drive. The current US political scene
demonstrates that, even if transparency is broadly achieved, faith in the
legitimacy of government policy does not necessarily follow.96 Judging by the
US experience, the European institutions thus not only have a distance to go
in the direction of openness and transparency - paying the substantial
operational price that openness and transparency entail - but have to travel
9 For a general perspective on the Commission, see Edwards & Spence, supra note 1,at 19-20.
93 Declaration No. 17, annexed to the TEU, states that "the transparency of the decisionmaking process strengthens the democratic nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in
the administration," and imposed on the Commission a duty to propose measures designed to
improve public access to information.
4 See Edwards & Spence, supra note 1, at 19-29.
96"The Commission urgently needs to be made more accountable, given the extension of its
responsibilities, power, and influence over the recent past." Ludlow, supra note 3, at 123.
96See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 3 (1982). See also generally R. Justin
Smith, Discretion and Legitimacy in International Regulation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1099 (1994).
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that road with rather little assurance that their policy assessments will survive
public scrutiny and that their overall decisional legitimacy will be enhanced.
The Sense of Mission
From nearly the beginning, the European Commission's performance has
been strongly driven by the idea that it was not only "custodian of the
European interest," 7 but the Community's veritable "engine" or "motor" of
legal integration." In other words, even while conducting the daily business of
government, the Commission carried the burden of defining and maintaining
the Community's programmatic momentum, that is to say, exercising "general
political leadership." 9 This aspect of the Commission has had decidedly
positive effects, among them attracting to Community service persons not only
of talent, 100 but also of purpose. The fact that Commission policymakers come
from all Member States, and operate (particularly at the services level) in a
climate of common problem-solving rather than negotiation, unquestionably
contributes to the sense of mission that I have described. The prospective entry
of central and eastern European States into the Union promises to prolong the
Commission's purposiveness, but at the same time heighten the problems of
management that lie ahead.
In fact, commentators are now claiming that Commission decisionmaking
has of late lost many of the signs of purposiveness and mission that
characterized it in the past, notably in the 1960's and the mid-to-late
1980's.101 It is of course difficult for US observers to gauge the force of that
claim, partly because they have become unaccustomed over recent years to the
federal government in the US asserting large-scale positive programs of social
or economic action. Up to now, the Community institutions -- and the
Commission in particular - have derived legitimacy from the fact that they
served programmatic goals enjoying broad public acceptability. Thus, the
Commission today faces the considerable challenge of performing its
regulatory tasks, without being buoyed by a widely-shared sense of mission.
The change, though situational, could be dramatic for the Commission in the
medium term.
CONCLUSION
Accounts of the Commission's processes for adopting legislative proposals
often give the impression that the Commissioners invariably direct the process
themselves. Such an impression is understandable, since certain

"

See Ludlow, supra note 3, at 122.
See notes 1 and 2 supra.

" See Ludlow, supra note 3 at 96-97. ("Since the EC was established, all Commissions have
interpreted their obligations under art. 155 to include "general" political leadership ....This
function of animateur (animator) permeates the whole structure and ethos of the institution.")
100 David Spence, Staff and Personnel Policy in the Commission, in THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 90.
101 Id.

at 91.
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Commissioners do maintain a high political profile and actively promote an
agenda. At all events, the Commissioners alone have the authority to accept or
reject a measure, or to adopt any variation on it that they please. Moreover, as
I have noted, 102 the Commission, unlike any agency in the US has "plenary"
authority, in the sense of exercising its proposal powers (as well as decisional
powers) across the whole range of European Community legal affairs.
Realistically viewed, however, the actual process of developing legislative
proposals is centered in the "services" of the Commission, over what can be a
long period of study and consultation, both within the Commission
bureaucracy and without. This fact has implications for any party - lobbyist
or regulatory partner, for example - seeking to participate in or influence the
regulatory process. The services' impressive body of experience in the conduct
of regulatory analyses may also have considerable interest for scholars of the
US regulatory process.
At the same time, the Commission's exercise of proposal-making powers
reflects its distinctiveness as an institution. Unlike some other national
executives - notably the American - the Commission exhibits a striking
degree of plenary collective authority and issues its regulatory proposals under
the salutary guidance of its own general Legal Service. While the Commission
is still struggling with demands for transparency, its greatest institutional
challenge is to preserve the sense of programmatic mission that it has
traditionally brought to Community governance or, failing that, to maintain a
strong sense of legitimacy and purpose nonetheless.

102

See note 75 supra and accompanying text.

